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The paper analyses the changes in tax policy, tax/GDP ratios, tax incidence and income 
inequality which have taken place in Latin America during the last decade against the 
background of the changes observed in these variables during the liberal years of the 
1980s and 1990s. The paper argues that the recent tax policy changes and a favourable 
external environment led to an increase of about three points in the regional tax/GDP 
ratio, that such increase in taxation took place in a slightly or substantially more 
progressive way than in the past, that the Gini coefficient of the distribution of household 
income improved on average by 0.4-0.8 points, and that, as a result, redistribution via 
taxation improved (especially in the Southern Cone) in relation to the 1990s thanks to 
greater reliance on direct taxes and a reduction in excises. However, in the mid-late 2000s 
taxation remains unequalizing in about a third of the countries of the region, especially in 
Central America. The paper concludes by offering recommendations on how the new 
fiscal pact evolving in the region can be strengthened to improve the redistributive effect 
of taxation in the years ahead. 
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1 Introduction 
During the last decade the Latin America policy makers and society have become 
increasingly aware of the problems caused by high social stratification, a situation in 
which a small elite owning most national assets coexists side by side with large sections 
of the population living below or at subsistence level. Much of this inequality is due to a 
skewed distribution of assets and opportunities which has distant colonial origins, and the 
reform of which has been hampered by the staunch resistance of traditional elites and new 
interest groups. However, the return to and consolidation of democracy during the 1990s 
and 2000s has encouraged several governments to correct some of these distributive 
problems by promoting, for instance, moderate fiscal reforms which are less controversial 
than more radical measures such as land reform and asset redistribution. As in the 
Western democracies, fiscal policy has thus become a policy instrument of choice. While 
important tax reforms were introduced also in the 1990s, these flatly ignored the issue of 
tax progressivity and redistribution. In contrast, a key element of the reforms recently 
introduced in several countries of the region is precisely the new emphasis placed on 
progressivity in tax design. This is an often ignored aspect of the decline of income 
inequality observed in the region during the last decade. Indeed, most analyses of the 
impact of the recent fiscal policy changes have focused on the distributive impact of 
social expenditure and income transfers. This paper aims at complementing these 
analyses by examining the distributive impact of recent changes in taxation. It does so by 
describing the recent tax policy changes against the background of those implemented 
during the 1980s and 1990s, by discussing their likely impact on growth and inequality, 
and by suggesting additional reforms which could be introduced in the main groups of 
countries in the region.  
2  Evolution of tax theory and policies, 1960-2000 
2.1  Approaches to taxation in the 1960s and 1970s 
In the early post-Second World War period, standard public economics (Atkinson 1991) 
assigned to taxation two main roles, i.e. financing public goods (infrastructure, human 
capital, law and order) and correcting a socially unacceptable distribution of market 
income via a progressive income tax and public transfers in cash and kind. In addition, as 
noted by Kaldor (1962: 2): ‘taxation … provides the most appropriate instruments for 
increasing savings for capital formation out of domestic sources’. 
 
According to this developmentalist view, tax policy aimed at promoting simultaneously 
growth and equity through the introduction of high ‘… progressive personal income tax 
(sometimes with marginal rates ranging up to 60 or 70 per cent) buttressed by a 
substantial corporate income tax (often at 50 per cent or so)’ (Bird 2003: 11). This 
approach presupposed that taxes had a minor impact on investment decisions. Kaldor 
(1963: 415), for instance, argued that ‘The reason for this is that for a successful 
businessman or corporation (in developed or undeveloped countries alike) the 
requirements of business expansion take precedence over the desire for higher 
consumption; the money that the owners take out of a business is generally no more than 
what is left after the business’s own needs are satisfied’. 
   6
This redistributive view of taxation and public expenditure applied also to the developing 
countries. However, the application of these principles therein faced considerable 
problems due to the predominantly rural and informal structure of their economies, their 
high level of income inequality (which required steep marginal tax rates to achieve a 
reasonable degree of equity), poor governance, weak tax administration, and resistance of 
the élites. Despite these problems, also in Latin America there was a gradual shift in the 
direction suggested by classical taxation theory. While at the beginning of the twentieth 
century, tax systems in the region were dominated by tariffs and commodity taxation, the 
drop in revenue caused by the fall in demand for primary commodities during the Great 
Depression, the high levels of wealth and income concentration, and the adoption of an 
import substitution industrialization strategy which entailed a broad involvement of the 
state in the economy led many policy makers in the region to introduce reforms to 
increase tax/GDP ratios, including through greater reliance on direct taxes (Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1: Average regional* Federal Government tax revenue and direct income taxation (% GDP), between 
1920 and 1970 
 
Note: * unweighted average of data for Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela. 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration on OxLAD data, Azar and Bertoni (2007); Sokoloff and Zolt (2006).  
 
However, in only a few cases did this policy turn out to be effective (Kaldor 1963). While 
there were improvements in vertical equity, horizontal equity was undermined by the 
presence of many exemptions, incentives and special fiscal regimes granted to specific 
industries and firm types. As reported by Bird and Oldman (1968: 8) the ‘larger part of 
the income tax is paid by companies, often largely foreign extractive enterprises, so that 
its importance reflects more the fortunes of world markets than successful domestic tax 
reform efforts’. In addition, hardly any progress was realized in the field of property 
taxation, as a high wealth concentration and strong ties to the political system allowed the 
elites to resist the levying of property and wealth taxes (Breceda et al. 2008; Sokoloff and 
Zolt 2006). The limited success of these reforms frequently pushed the policy makers to 
introduce ‘second best’ indirect and ad hoc taxes which contributed to the complexity of 
the tax system. As a result, for instance, in the 1960s Costa Rica and Bolivia had 
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2.2  Taxation in Latin America during the neoliberal decades of the 1980s and 1990s 
Since the early 1980s, many developed and developing countries experienced a ‘fiscal 
policy revolution’ in which ‘redistribution became a secondary goal of tax design’ 
(Mahon 2009: 4). The new objectives of tax policy became economic efficiency (and by 
implication the reduction of the efficiency costs of direct taxes), horizontal equity and 
revenue adequacy. To reach these goals, countries had to widen their tax base, rationalize 
the tax structure and simplify tax administration. In this context, the World Bank, IMF, 
and Inter-American Development Bank played a central role in defining the guidelines of 
the new tax systems. ‘The World Bank started to incorporate tax policy and 
administration in its menu of fiscal adjustment advice. IMF technical assistance on 
taxation became more closely linked with its numerous adjustment and lending 
programmes, and it placed greater emphasis on tax administration and implementation. 
The Inter-American Development Bank also increased its financing of tax reform 
projects’ (Goode 1993, quoted in Lledo et al. 2004: 21). Overall, the design of tax policy 
was influenced by the belief that ‘It may be more appropriate to reduce the size of 
government, as indeed is the explicit objective of an increasing number of developing 
countries, than to increase the level of taxation significantly above historical levels’ 
(World Bank 1991: 18).  
 
This approach was justified by four arguments. First of all, the growing emphasis placed 
on ‘government failures’, including in providing public services, on the fact that ‘the 
market knows best’ what services are demanded by citizens willing to pay for their 
provision, and on the residual role to which the state had been relegated following the 
creeping privatization of health, education, pensions and public infrastructure. This 
approach entailed a lesser need for revenue. 
 
Second, the lower need for revenue was consistent with the objective of reducing ‘the 
efficiency costs of taxation’. The basic idea was that taxation distorts the agents’ 
allocative decisions. As noted by the World Bank (1991: 22) ‘When firms and households 
are influenced by the goal of reducing their tax payments, they make decisions based 
more on their tax implications than on their inherent economic virtues’. Hence, the tax 
system ‘should not interfere with incentives to channel resources into their most 
productive economic uses, and not create incentives for investments designed merely to 
avoid taxes’ (Walsh 1986: 1).  
 
Third, ‘most analysts and policy makers had come to believe that high tax rates not only 
discouraged economic activity but were ineffective in redistributing income and wealth’ 
(Bird and Zolt 2005: 8). More emphasis was thus placed on horizontal rather than vertical 
equity. As noted by Thirsk (1991: iii), ‘[the governments] recognize that accepting a state 
of crude justice in taxation and avoiding fine-tuning is better than seeking some 
unattainable goal of perfect justice’. While high tax rates on income became less popular, 
it was emphasized that moderate redistribution was to be achieved through targeted 
income transfers. Finally, tax reform had to be administratively and politically feasible. 
Developing countries presented a limited tax administration capacity because of poor 
information systems, corruption, and political pressure (World Bank 1991). Thus, while 
tax administration had to be strengthened, tax structure had to be related to a country’s 
administrative capacity. Simplifying the tax system and strengthening tax administration 
thus became important goals in the tax design (World Bank 1991).   8
Specific measures of the neoliberal tax reform and their impact on tax collection 
Trade and indirect taxation. Trade taxes (as well as any other type of trade protection) 
were seen as a cause of inefficiency in domestic production and the international 
allocation of resources, and thus had to be replaced by VAT and other consumption 
taxes.1 As a result of the new approach, ‘The average tariff on imports in South American 
countries dropped from 55 per cent in 1985 to approximately 10 per cent in 2000, and in 
the group of Central American countries and Mexico the fall was even steeper, from 66 to 
6 six per cent’ (Lora 2007: 3).  
 
To offset the loss of revenue from trade taxes, countries increasingly relied on domestic 
consumption taxes. Assuring relatively small efficiency losses, a VAT with tax rates 
ranging between 10 to 20 per cent (and a zero rate for exports) was considered a reliable 
source of revenue with short collection lags. Nonetheless, considering the regressive 
nature of the VAT, it was accepted to exempt from VAT products that accounted for a 
large part of the poor’s spending. In addition, selective excises were also to be reformed, 
and had to be preferably levied on goods which generate negative externalities (e.g. 
tobacco and alcohol) or luxury goods. The majority of countries introduced a uniform 
VAT rate, while Brazil, Colombia, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua and Uruguay 
introduced multiple rates (Carciofi and Cetrangolo 1994). ‘Typically, food and essentials 
are taxed at low rates or at a zero rate; normal goods are taxed at an intermediate 
‘general’ rate; and luxuries are taxed at a higher rate’ (Shome 1992: 13). From an initial 
level of 11.3 per cent, the average VAT rate for the region rose to 14.4 per cent in 2000 
(Table 1).  
 
Table 1: Latin American countries: VAT rates in the 1980s, 1992, 2000 and 2010 
 
  Year of introduction  Initial rate  1992  2000  2010 
Argentina  1975  16.0  18.0  21.0  21.0 
Bolivia   1973  10.0  14.9  14.9  13.0 
Brazil  1967  15.0  20.5  20.5  20.0 
Chile  1975  20.0  18.0  18.0  19.0 
Colombia  1975  10.0  12.0  15.0  16.0 
Costa Rica  1975  10.0  8.0  13.0  13.0 
Dominican Republic  1983  6.0  6.0  8.0  16.0 
Ecuador  1970  10.0  10.0  12.0  12.0 
El Salvador  1992  …  10.0  13.0  13.0 
Guatemala  1983  7.0  7.0  10.0  12.0 
Honduras  1976  3.0  7.0  12.0  12.0 
Mexico  1980  10.0  10.0  15.0  15.0 
Nicaragua  1975  6.0  10.0  15.0  15.0 
Panama  1977  5.0  5.0  5.0  5.0 
Paraguay  1993  …  10.0  10.0  10.0 
Peru  1976  20.0  18.0  18.0  19.0 
Uruguay  1987  21.0  22.0  23.0  22.0 
Venezuela  1993  …  10.0  15.5  12.0 
Average   11.3  12.0  14.4  14.7 
 
Source: CEPALSTAT and Shome (1992). 
 
Direct taxation. The reforms of the 1980s and 1990s introduced also a major 
simplification of the personal income tax (PIT). The supply-side economists claimed that 
tax rates were beyond the optimal level, and affected microeconomic incentives, labour 
                                                 
1  Some temporary exceptions were made for import taxes so as to provide revenue in difficult times or 
protect domestic infant/restructuring industries (Stotsky 1995).   9
supply and investments. In addition, in an increasingly open economy, high corporate tax 
rates were seen as a possible cause of capital flights and discouragement of FDI, while 
lowering direct tax rates could have simplified revenue collection and reduced incentives 
to evade taxes. The marginal rates of the personal and corporate income tax had thus to be 
reduced substantially. While the World Bank recommended to reduce the number of rates 
and the top marginal rate between 30 and 50 per cent, the IMF suggested three or fewer 
brackets and a top marginal rate lower than 40 (World Bank 1991; Stotsky 1995). In 
addition, ‘the increasing integration of the world’s capital markets and the dismantling of 
capital controls in most countries exerted considerable pressure to reduce or eliminate 
their taxes on interest income’ (Thirsk 1991: 40). The revenue losses entailed by these 
measures were to be compensated by limiting deductions, exemptions and tax allowances 
(Stotsky 1995). As suggested by Tanzi (1990: 18): ‘A broad “guideline” has been that 
personal exemptions should normally not exceed the per capita income of the country and 
top rates should begin to apply at, say, about ten times the per capita income’. Broadening 
the tax base was possible by subjecting more types of income to taxation, using more 
presumptive taxation, withholding at the source and other measures. ‘As a result, 
whatever loss of vertical equity may have occurred as a result of these developments, 
there may be offsetting gains in administrative simplicity and the attainment of greater 
horizontal equity’ (Thirsk 1991: 22). As the exemptions generally concerned corporations 
and middle and high income households, their reduction was expected to have a 
favourable distributive effect. Finally, the international organizations suggested ‘to make 
the tax system neutral to inflation by indexing tax brackets, credits, standard deductions, 
and other nominal amounts to inflation’ (Stotsky 1995: 281).  
 
As a result, PIT rates were lowered and their number reduced. Between 1980 and 2000 
the average top marginal rate dropped from 50 to 29 per cent (Figure 2). In extreme 
cases—as in the 1974 tax reforms of Uruguay (1974) and Paraguay (1992)—the PIT was 
eliminated, while Bolivia and Colombia adopted a flat rate of 10 and 35 per cent 
respectively. To promote horizontal equity, several countries abolished personal 
exemptions, deductions and income splitting for married couples (Bird 1992). Taxation of 
the net income of corporations was also simplified, favouring at the same time the 
convergence of the corporate tax rate with the top personal rate (Figure 2). The reduction 
in top rates was significant but less dramatic than that of PIT as it fell from 41 to 29 per 
cent. 
 
All in all, the tax reforms of the 1980s and 1990s focused mainly on shifting from vertical 
equity to horizontal equity, widening the tax base, tax simplification and reduction of 
personal income tax rates. As a consequence, the tax structure started changing in the 
early 1980s—while the share of revenue generated by excises remained stable, that of 
general consumption taxes increased sharply, that on international trade and individual 
income taxes decreased, while that from corporate income tax remained constant 
(Table 2). 
    10
Figure 2: Latin America: average top marginal tax rates on personal and corporate income,  
between 1980 and 2000 
 
Source: CEPALSTAT; Economic Freedom of the World 2009 Annual Report and Shome (1992). 
 
Table 2: Evolution of the average tax structure for Latin America (% of total tax revenue), 1975- 2002) 
 
  Income tax  Domestic goods and services  International 
trade    Individual Corporate  General  consumption  Excises 
1975–80 10  18  16  14  23 
1986–92 10  18  17  13  21 
1996–2002 7  19  36  14  14 
Source: Bird and Zolt (2005). 
Trends in tax/GDP ratios, redistribution, and macro stability  
During the late 1980s, tax revenues declined because of the impact of the reforms, slow 
growth and the erosion of the tax base by inflation (Figure 3). Such a trend continued in 
the 1990s, and only by 2000 the tax/GDP ratio recovered the level of the early 1980s. 
Obviously, there were different trends in the region, and Bird (2003) shows that countries 
with a tax/GDP ratio above the regional mean in the early 1980s were those which 
exhibited the highest level of taxation also at the end of 1990s. 
 
Figure 3: Trend in tax/GDP ratio in Latin America, 1973 to 2009 
 


























































































The Washington Consensus: 
Second Wave of Reforms 
The New Tax 
Consensus  
The Washington Consensus:  
First Wave of Reforms   11
The decline in tax/GDP ratio of the 1980s and 1990s conditioned the overall development 
of the region. With rising debt servicing obligations and a fall in tax/GDP ratios, the 
deficit reduction in several countries was achieved by means of cuts in public expenditure 
on investments and human capital. However, despite the immediate improvements in 
fiscal balance, the decline in public investment in infrastructure had an adverse impact on 
growth and the long-term budget deficits. As argued by Perry et al. (2008), this approach 
led to a vicious circle in which low growth, low revenues and fiscal cuts generated an 
illusory fiscal adjustment.  
 
The tax reforms of the 1980s and 1990s had also important implications for income 
distribution. Regression analysis of changes in income inequality in Latin America shows 
that a fall in the ratio of direct to indirect taxes raised in a significant way the Gini 
coefficient of the distribution of disposable income (Cornia 2010). Morley (2000) comes 
to similar conclusions noting that the tax changes of the 1990s shifted the burden of 
taxation away from the wealthy to the middle and lower classes. Similar findings were 
obtained by Chu et al. (2004) on a panel of developing countries for the years 1980s and 
1990s. In particular, these authors show that the decline in tax/GDP and reduced 
contribution of direct taxes led to a fall in tax progressiveness, which correlated with the 
inequality rise observed over the 1980s and 1990s. 
 
Finally, the reduction in overall revenue/GDP ratios due to the above tax changes, the 
priority given to debt servicing, the partial privatization of pensions and health, and the 
decentralization of their provision undermined the financing of public welfare (ECLAC 
2010). As a result, during the 1980s, ‘public spending on health, education, social 
security, and housing fell in absolute terms in 10 of 14 Latin American countries and in 8 
of 14 as a share of GDP’ (McGuire 2010: 5), while social spending became regressive in 
10 of 12 countries (ECLAC 2007).  
3  The tax changes of the last decade 
Important changes occurred in this area during the last 15 years, in particular since the 
early 2000s, and as a result the regional tax/GDP ratio rose by three GDP points between 
2000 and 2009 (Figure 3).  
3.1  Contextual factors  
Several policy and non-policy factors explain the shift in tax regimes and increase in 
tax/GDP ratios observed in the region since the early 2000s. The first and probably 
foremost factor is the failure of the overall neoliberal reform package to deliver an 
adequate growth of GDP and a modicum of improvement in income inequality. In 
particular, the reduction of PIT and CIT tax rates of the 1980s and 1990s failed to 
improve microeconomic incentives and stimulate growth. Likewise, the reduction in 
tariffs generated a loss of revenue but did not lead to reallocation of production factors to 
new sectors. While jobs in the formerly protected sectors were lost, only few workplaces 
were created in the emerging tradable sector, as the comparative advantage of the region 
in labour intensive manufacturing was quickly eroded by the entry into the world market 
of low-cost Asian producers of manufactures (Koujianou-Goldberg and Pavcnik 2007). In 
addition, the revenue decline experienced during the neoliberal era entailed large cuts in 
public investments and led, as noted, to a vicious circle of low growth, low revenues and 
new fiscal deficit which implied a weakening of public sector solvency.    12
 
A second factor contributing to the shift in tax policy is the evidence of the latest wave of 
endogenous growth models (Rebelo 1991; Mendoza et al. 1997) and the related empirical 
evidence which emphasize the importance for GDP growth of human capital expenditure 
and investment in infrastructure. Contrary to the traditional view, the latter were found to 
‘crowd in’ private investments and raise the growth rate of GDP. An empirical study 
(Calderón and Sérven 2004a, quoted in Fay and Morrison 2005) found for instance that in 
Argentina, a country which suffered during the 1990s huge cuts in public investments, 
improving infrastructure to the level of the regional leader (Costa Rica) would result, 
ceteris paribus, in an increase of the GDP growth rate of 1.7 points a year, while 
improving it to the level of the median East Asian country would raise it by three 
percentage points. 
 
A third factor was the growing call for equity in the aftermath of the steep increase in 
inequality which took place during the 1980s and 1990s, including because of the failure 
to promote redistribution via taxation and social transfers. Despite a return to democracy 
during the 1990s, the elites were able to maintain the status quo ‘… at all levels of 
government thanks to their traditional practices of clientelism, personalism and 
patronage’ (Panizza 2000: 747). Thus, contrary to the predictions of the median voter 
theorem, the mere return to democracy failed to generate sufficient pressure in favour of 
progressive taxation. However, as indicated by successive waves of the Latinobarómetro, 
the majority of the population had grown deeply disappointed with the slow growth, 
rising inequality and social cuts recorded during the 1980s and 1990s by elite-dominated 
regimes (Figure 4). Such disappointment concerned also much of the middle and lower-
middle class which had traditionally supported moderately conservative parties (Panizza 
2005).  
 
Figure 4: Latin America: variations in people’s perception of country economic performance, 
country progress and fairness in income distribution, during the late 1990s, early 2000s and late 
2000s 
 
Note: Questions refer to the variation in the percentage of positive answers. 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration on Latinobarómetro (2010). 
 
This call for equity acquired strength with the gradual consolidation of democracy 
(measured by the ‘democracy score’ of Polity2) and the parallel shift of political 
preferences toward left of centre parties (Figure 5) more sensitive to distributional issues, 













introduced in Brazil in 1998. Given the prudent fiscal stance adopted by most of the new 
regimes, redistribution via the state budget required an increase in taxation, and in 
particular in income tax. The left-of-centre countries performed somewhat better in terms 
of raising additional revenue and tax progressivity but also some conservative ones 
recorded—with the exception of Mexico—a surge in tax/GDP ratios (Cornia and 
Martorano 2009). 
 
Figure 5: Regional average ‘democracy score’ as measured by Polity2 (left scale) and trend in the 
number of left of centre governments in 18 Latin American countries (right scale), 1990-2008 
 
Source: IDLA dataset. 
 
 
A fourth factor which made higher taxation acceptable to many was the greater emphasis 
placed on ‘fiscal exchange’, by which governments can raise taxes if at the same time 
increase the quantity and quality of the social services provided (Fjeldstad et al. 2009). As 
noted by Bird (2003: 24–25): ‘in a (Wicksellian) democratic framework in which 
expenditure and tax decisions are taken conjointly … the existing tax structure, whatever 
it may be, must be assumed to be imposed in full knowledge of its consequences, 
reflecting the social judgment that the benefits of the actions financed more than 
compensate for all costs of taxation’. Thus, in the long term the legitimacy and ability to 
raise taxes is affected by the efficiency of government expenditure. In this respect, the 
reforms of the neoliberal era reduced the role of the state in the provision of public 
services, as the middle-class often opted for private alternatives causing in this way a 
reduction in the quality of public service and the satisfaction of their users (Huber 2009). 
In contrast, since the early 2000s, there has been an increase in social transfers and a 
broadening of the access to primary health care and secondary education (Huber 2009).  
 
Finally, in a few countries, the rise in tax/GDP ratios was also explained by a number of 
contingent factors, such as higher commodity prices (see later), faster growth of GDP 
since 2003 (which modestly raised tax buoyancy),2 (Table 3), and labour policies 
favouring the re-formalization of the economy and so contributing to an expansion of the 
tax base.  
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Table 3: Tax buoyancy in Latin America during the 1990s and 2000s 
 
 1990-2001  2002-08 
Argentina 1.18  1.32 
Bolivia 1.56  1.30 
Brazil 1.02  1.13 
Chile 1.10  1.18 
Colombia 1.20  1.33 
Costa Rica  1.06  1.15 
Dominican Rep.  1.30  1.19 
Ecuador 1.02  1.18 
El Salvador  1.14  1.34 
Guatemala 1.20  0.97 
Honduras 1.06  1.13 
Mexico 0.97  0.60 
Nicaragua 1.21 1.36 
Panama 1.10  1.24 
Paraguay 1.19  1.16 
Peru 1.07  1.37 
Uruguay 1.01  1.12 
Venezuela 0.93 1.20 
LAC 1.13  1.18 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration on official data. 
3.2 Administative  reforms 
These reforms aimed at decreasing the cost of collection and tax evasion. Almost all 
countries implemented a functional rationalization of tax administration, while half of 
them adopted a Semi Autonomous Revenue Authority (SARA) (Table 4). On the one 
hand, these changes increased the simplification, uniformity and specialization in the 
administration of taxes. On the other hand, they assured a major accountability and 
independence from political pressures.  
 
Moreover, several Latin American countries created large taxpayer units and presumptive 
system of taxation for small taxpayers which allowed to reduce transaction costs and 
increase tax compliance, and made wider use of standardized withholding (ibid.). 
Administrative improvements came also from the application of new technologies. By 
influencing the work and capacity of the public administration, they contributed to 
modernize operations, and reduce costs, corruption and evasion. For example, in Chile 
‘the simplification of the system was indeed accompanied by a noteworthy development 
in the computerization of the taxation process, which reached … a higher degree than in 
OECD countries’ (Cominetta 2007: 18). In this regard, to assure an optimal application of 
new technologies, countries introduced merit criteria for the official selections. For 
example, ‘in Brazil, the strengthening of the meritocracy in the federal government raised 
the proportion of officials with university degrees from 39 to 63 per cent between 1995 
and 2001. In Costa Rica about half the jobs in central government are covered by merit-
based selection thanks to the relative independence enjoyed by the agency that controls 
these processes’ (Lora 2007: 17).    15
 




organization of tax 
administration 
Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dom. Rep., Ecuador, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru, Uruguay 
Semi-autonomous 
revenue authority  Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Dom. Rep., Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico, Peru 
Large taxpayers unit  Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dom. Rep., Ecuador, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru, Uruguay 
Simplified or 
presumptive taxation 
for small taxpayers 
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dom. Rep., Ecuador, 
Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru, Uruguay 
Customs*  Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Guatemala, Peru, Venezuela 
 
 
Notes: * ‘custom indicates that tax and customs administration operate as an integrated 
institution’. http://www.fiscalreform.net 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration on ‘The Collecting Taxes Data System, 2009/2010’. 
http://www.fiscalreform.net/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=759&Itemid=134 
3.3  Changes in tax policy 
As noted by Dominguez (1997), several Latin American policy makers thought that 
economic orthodoxy would not yield optimal solutions to national economic problems 
and opted for ‘a competent state, in contrast to the vanishing state of some neoliberal 
prescriptions’ (ibid.: 13). Within this broad framework, redistribution returned to be a 
primary goal of tax design.  
 
The taxation of income and wealth underwent a number of changes. For instance, the 
2007 Uruguayan tax reform introduced ex-novo a progressive PIT and a flat CIT. In 
Ecuador, the 2008 tax reform introduced a progressive income taxation, though its real 
effect remains in doubt. In turn, in 2008, the Mexican government introduced the IETU 
(Impuesto Empresarial de Tasa Única), a minimum tax which aims at strengthening the 
collection of CIT. Peru, in turn, modified in 2009 the income tax on physical persons, by 
shifting from a global and progressive tax schedule for all incomes to a dual system 
inspired by the Scandinavian model.  
 
Furthermore, with the exception of Chile and Ecuador, in all countries the income per 
capita at which the highest direct marginal tax rate is applied was lowered substantially 
(Table 5, right panel). Most governments also eliminated or reduced a long list of 
exemptions, deductions and tax holidays which had been introduced in the 1980s and 
1990s to attract foreign investments. Evaluations of the impact of these tax incentives 
showed that in most cases the benefits generated were minimal. These exemptions were 
thus reduced so that the revenue loss they entailed declined to 1.53 of GDP in 2009 
(Table 5, left panel). 
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Table 5: Personal exemption level and upper income bracket as shares of GDP per capita in 
selected Latin American countries, 1985, 2001 and 2009 
 
  Revenue loss due to income tax exemptions 
accorded to individuals and firms 
Upper income tax rate (as a share of average 
GDP per capita) 
  1985 2001 2009 1985 2001 2009 
Argentina 0.8  1.4  0.3 21.4 16.5 4.5 
Brazil  0.3 1.5 1.1  10.1  3.1 2.2 
Chile  0.2 0.1 1.3 2.8 1.2  14.1 
Colombia 0.0  4.1  2.5 20.5  16.6 9.4 
Costa  Rica  1.2 0.8 0.5 1.4 3.7 2.3 
Dominican 
Rep.  1.1  2.3  2.0 413.5 5.8  4.2 
Ecuador  0.4  2.4  2.3 29.2 8.3 24.0 
El Salvador  2.3  1.2  1.2  171.7  11.0  7.3 
Guatemala 0.9  5.0  1.8  356  22.5  16.9 
Honduras 0.0  3.6  2.2 600.4  36.0 16.0 
Mexico 0.7  0.1  0.1  21.3  44.0  4.1 
Nicaragua 1.7  7.7  2.9  56.9 61.2 28.8 
Panama 0.3 0.9 1.5 89  57.8  5.1 
LAC 0.76  2.39  1.53  138.01  22.13  10.70 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration on Stotsky and WoldeMariam (2002) and on ‘The Collecting Taxes 
Data System, 2009/2010’. 
http://www.fiscalreform.net/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=759&Itemid=134 
 
These measures concerned the formal economy, and much less so the informal and small 
scale sector which constitute an important part of the economy of Latin America. This 
prompted policy makers to introduce new forms of pragmatic taxation, marking in this way 
an important difference respect to the past (Gonzales 2009). The most evident example of 
this approach was the adoption of simplified and presumptive taxation (Table 6). 
 




(% of total tax 
income) 
Taxpayer 
(% of total 
taxpayers) 
Year 
Brazil   Sistema Integrado de Pago de Impuestos y 
Contribuciones (SIMPLES)   6.3 67.6  2004 
Uruguay  Impuesto a la Pequeña Empresa (IPE)   0.6  *  2007 
Argentina  Régimen Simplificado para Pequeños 
Contribuyentes (Monotributo)  0.5 *  2010 
Nicaragua  Régimen Especial de Estimación Administrativa  0.5  *  2008 
Peru 
Règimen Unico Simplificado (RUS)  
Régimen Especial del Impuesto a la Renta (RER) 
0.2 15.2  2008 
Paraguay Tributo  Unico  0.1  62.9  2007 
Chile  Régimen Simplificado (RS)  0.1  9.0  2007 
Bolivia 
Régimen Tributario Simplificado (RTS) 
Régimen Agropecuario Unificado (RAU) 
Sistema Tributario Integrado (STI) 
0.1 18.2  2007 
Source: Arias (2009) and Administración Federal de Ingresos Públicos for Monotributo (Argentina). 
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Presumptive taxation is used in response to the inability of the tax administration to 
ascertain the assets and income of many potential taxpayers, it replaces several taxes, and 
is not levied on the income declared by the taxpayer but on an estimate of it made by tax 
authorities on the basis of indicators of gross turnover, gross assets, number of 
employees, electricity consumption and other parameters. The strengthening of 
presumptive taxation was accompanied by a simplification of the taxation of self-
employed taxpayers (IDB 2006). For instance, since 1997 Brazil has adopted a 
presumptive system (Simples) which substituted the corporate income tax, the social 
contribution on net profits, the tax on industrial goods and social security payments 
(ibid.). Since 1998, the ‘Monotributo’ in Argentina integrated the social security 
payments, income tax, minimum tax on assets, and VAT (ibid.).  
 
Several countries also introduced a ‘surrogate’ tax on financial transactions. For example, 
Brazil introduced in 1996 the Contribución Provisoria sobre el Movimiento o 
Transmisión de Valores y Créditos de Naturaleza Financiera (CPMF) with the aim of 
financing the public health system. Venezuela in 2002 introduced the Impuesto al Débito 
Bancario (IDB) to compensate the negative trend on oil revenue (Gonzales 2009). In turn, 
Mexico introduced the IDE (Impuesto a los Depósitos en Efectivo) which, by being 
deductible from the federal taxes, aims at reducing the informality of the economy, 
broaden the tax base and diminish the tax rates. Standard economic theory suggests that 
these taxes generate distortions and lead to financial disintermediation. Yet, they can be 
seen as an emergency tool introduced during difficult times due to raise revenue 
collection or as a ‘second best’ tool to tax financial assets and rents which would 
otherwise remain untaxed. In 2008, the revenue generated by financial taxes ranged 
between 1.20 and 7.15 per cent of total tax revenue, or between 0.28 and 1.89 per cent of 
GDP (Table 7).  
 
Table 7: Financial transaction taxes revenue in 
selected Latin American countries around 2008 
 
 
In per cent of 
GDP Tax  revenue 
Argentina 1.89  7.15 
Bolivia 0.28  1.2 
Brazil 1.40  5.75 
Colombia 0.67  5.01 
Peru 0.31  1.95 
Venezuela 0.91  6.74 
 
Source: Coelho (2009). 
 
No major changes were introduced instead in the VAT which had witnessed a major 
expansion during the 1980s and 1990s (Table 1 and Figure 9). However, several 
governments made a greater use of other indirect taxes so as to increase both revenue and 
the equity of their tax systems, as in the case of Ecuador’s ‘Impuesto a los Consumos 
Especiales’, a tax on luxury items introduced in 2008. No major changes were recorded 
also for trade taxes.    18
3.4  Rising commodity prices and their revenue impact 
In eight of the 18 countries analysed in this paper public revenue rose also due to an 
increase in the fiscal resources (taxes and non-taxes) generated by a rise in international 
commodity prices and demand3 (Figure 6). Moreover, the governments of Bolivia, Chile 
and Venezuela created new taxes to raise the revenue from non-renewable resources by 
taxing their commercialization. The largest revenue rise in relation to 1999-2001 (a 
period of very low commodity prices) was recorded in oil- and gas-rich Bolivia and 
Ecuador where these additional resources accounted respectively for a hefty 5.7 and 4.1 
per cent of GDP, while in the remaining six the rise in relation to 1999-2001 ranged by 
between 1.1 (Colombia) and 2.8 (Chile) per cent of GDP. In turn, Argentina (an exporter 
of agricultural commodities) financed part of its increase in public spending with funds 
(2.5 per cent of GDP) generated by export duties on agricultural commodities.  
 
The increase in fiscal revenue/GDP ratio due to the recent ‘commodities bonanza’ 
accounted respectively for 33 per cent of the total increase between 1999-2001 and 2007-
9 in Argentina, 38 per cent in Colombia, 51 per cent in Peru, and the quasi totality of the 
increase in Bolivia and Ecuador (see also Jiménez and Gómez-Sabaini 2009). The tax and 
non-tax revenue originating from this sector were higher in relation to GDP in 2007-9 
than in 1990-92 in all eight countries considered with the exception of Venezuela which, 
despite the recent decline (Figure 6), remains the country with the highest revenue 
originating from the commodity sector. 
                                                 
3  Several Latin American countries are endowed with sizeable natural resources, the exploitation of which 
produces additional tax and non-tax revenue which permits to expand public expenditure, or create 
stabilization funds (as in Chile). In many cases (as Mexico and Venezuela), a sustained flow of non-tax 
revenue from the natural resources sector has given rise to a sort of ‘fiscal laziness’ which delayed much 
needed structural tax reforms.The usual way governments transform the wealth of natural resources into 
fiscal revenue is through their exploitation by state companies or via the control of part of the stock of 
private companies operating in this sector, as in the case of Corporación Nacional del Cobre 
(CODELCO) in Chile, and Pemex in Mexico which transfer part of their profits to the public budget.In 
addition, the governments of these countries benefit from royalties (usually linked to the volume of 
production of these resources),the tax revenue generated from the income tax levied (often at 
differential rates) on firms operating in this sector, and from the application of export taxes.   19
Figure 6: Fiscal revenues originating from primary commodities (% of GDP) 
 
Notes: Fiscal revenue generated by the primary commodity sector include: taxes on the export of 
agricultural commodities in Argentina; taxes on hydrocarbon extraction and sale (ICE e IDH) and 
royalties in Bolivia; the net income generated by CODELCO on copper sales in Chile; the 
dividends of Ecopetrol, corporate income tax and royalties paid by oil companies in Colombia; the 
revenue derived from oil exports and sales in Ecuador; the profits of PEMEX and tax revenue, 
concessions and other priviledges of the federal government in Mexico; the taxation of the mining 
and oil rent in Peru; and taxes on incomes and dividends as well as royalties of PDVSA in 
Venezuela. 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration on the basis of CEPAL data. 
3.5  Trends in tax/GDP ratio and changes in the structure of tax revenue 
While the liberal approaches of the 1980s and early 1990s led in most Latin American 
countries to a drop in the tax/GDP ratio and a decline in the redistributive capacity of 
fiscal policy (Lledo et al. 2003), the new ‘fiscal pact’ of the last decade brought about a 
substantial increase in revenue and some changes in its composition. Indeed, between 
2001 and 2008 the tax/GDP ratio reached its highest historical level (Table 8 and Figure 
3). This average increase masks however a very heterogeneous situation.Very large 
revenue increases were recorded in Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia and Nicaragua, which by 
the mid-late 2000s reached levels of taxation similar to those of the USA and Japan. 
Important increases were recorded also in Colombia and the Dominican Republic. On the 
other hand, in Guatemala, Paraguay, Venezuela, El Salvador and Panama the tax/GDP 
ratio rose well below the regional average, while in Mexico it dropped by 1.58 points of 
GDP. It is important to stress that such revenue increase is mostly structural. Indeed, as 
argued by (Vladkova-Hollar and Zettelmeyer 2008:5) ‘The business cycle cannot have 
played a significant direct role in raising revenue ratios. Improved fiscal positions seem to 
mostly reflect persistently higher commodity prices, as well as changes in taxation and 
tax administration’. This conclusion is strengthened by the observation that the regional 
tax/GDP ratio declined minimally during the recession and fall in commodity prices 
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Table 8: Tax revenue/GDP
/a (including social security contributions) 18 Latin American countries, 1980-2009 
 
 1980
/b 1990  2000  2008  2009 ∆ (2000–08)  ∆ (2008–09) 
Brazil  20.60 26.36 30.39 35.50 34.28  5.11 -1.22 
Argentina  19.20 16.02 21.48 30.60 31.62  9.12 1.02 
Uruguay  20.00 21.24 22.53 23.30 25.07  0.77 1.77 
Bolivia  …  9.35  17.95 21.70 22.59  3.75 0.89 
Nicaragua …  10.67  17.5  21.70  22.21  4.20 0.51 
Costa  Rica  12.90 16.88 18.85 23.10 21.64  4.25 -1.46 
Ecuador  10.60 10.07 11.62 16.50 17.86  4.82 1.36 
Chile  25.61 15.54 18.92 20.90 17.20  1.98 -3.7 
Panama  18.57 14.73 16.01 16.50 16.96  0.49 0.46 
Honduras  14.70 12.87  14.3  15.90 15.67  1.60 -0.23 
Peru  17.50 11.73 14.06 17.40 15.25  3.34 -2.15 
Colombia  10.32 11.50 14.93 18.00 14.97  3.07 -3.03 
Venezuela  22.19 18.66 13.62 14.20 14.47  0.58 0.27 
Paraguay  8.80  9.88  12.04 13.70 14.46  1.64 0.76 
El  Salvador  …  10.53 12.38 14.60 14.05  2.22 -0.55 
Dominican  Rep.  11.06 10.84 11.33 15.00 13.13  3.67 -1.87 
Mexico  11.90 11.44 10.98  9.40  11.25  -1.58 1.85 
Guatemala  9.20  7.62  10.88 11.60 10.75  0.72 -0.85 
LAC  15.54 13.66 16.10 18.87 18.52  2.77 -0.35 
 
Notes: a/Tax revenue refers to central governments and thus it excludes taxes imposed by sub-national 
governments. However, the data for Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Costa Rica refer to the 
general government. b/The data for 1980 are not fully comparable with those for the subsequent years.  
 
Source: CEPALSTAT.   21
Figure 7: Tax/GDP ratios in Latin America (net of social security contributions)4 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration on the basis of CEPAL data. 
 
It is important to note that the rise in tax/GDP ratios observed during the last two decades 
in Latin America occurred also in all developing regions, all of which had by the late 
2000s tax/GDP ratios ranging between 15 and 20 per cent. However, the increase 
recorded in Latin America stands out as the fastest, and by 2006-07 the region had the 
highest tax/GDP ratio (including social security contributions) of all developing regions 
(Figure 8). Such ratio remains, however, well below that of the OECD countries where 
revenue accounts on average for some 35 per cent of GDP. 
 
Figure 8: Average tax/GDP ratio in the main regions of the world (% of GDP) 
 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration on the basis of CEPAL, Government Finance Statistics (IMF); International 
Financial Statistics (IMF) and World Economic Outlook (IMF). Includes social security contributions. 
 
                                                 
4  At the moment the 18 countries of the region can be divided into three groups of persistently high, 
medium and low tax burden. As the average tax/GDP ratio of the region (including social security 
contributions) equal to 17.8 per cent over the period 2002-09, the intermediate group includes those 
countries with tax burdens of +/-20 per cent of the average, i.e. 14.2 and 21.4 per cent of GDP (Figure 
7). Group 1 includes countries (Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay) with an average tax/GDP ratio greater 
than 21.4 per cent over that period, i.e. tax/GDP ratios nearly twice as large of those of Group 3 
countries (Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico and Paraguay). 
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The policy changes described in Section 3.2 led to visible changes in revenue structure 
between 1990 and 2001 (Figure 9), including a perceptible decline in revenue generated 
by taxes on international trade and ‘other taxes’, a sizeable increase in VAT revenue, and 
substantial stability of excises, social security contributions, and income and wealth taxes. 
In contrast, the changes which took place over 2001-09 raised the share of taxes on 
incomes and capital gains, reduced the share of regressive selective taxes,5 shifted part of 
the burden of such taxes on luxury items in Argentina, Ecuador and Uruguay, cut further 
the share of revenue of taxes on international trade, while leaving broadly unchanged the 
share of wealth taxes, other taxes and social security contributions. 
 
 
Figure 9: Evolution of revenue structure (% of total revenue) in Latin America, 1990, 2001 and 
2009 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration on the basis of CEPAL data. 
 
More detailed information on the changes in taxation structure and level is provided in 
Table 9 which shows that the countries of Groups 1 and 2 were the main source of the 
surge in the regional tax/GDP ratio and shift in tax structure discussed above, i.e. a 
sustained growth of general consumption taxes (VAT and similar), a significant reduction 
in taxes on international trade (led by Groups 2 and 3), a reduction on excises and other 
selective taxes on goods and services (due mainly to changes in countries of Group 1), a 
recent increase of income tax (which concerned all three country groups), stagnation at 
low level of wealth taxes, except for some improvements in the countries of Group 1.  
 
 
                                                 
5  Most countries now follow the ‘inverse Ramsey rule’ and apply excises on the consumption of goods 
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Table 9: Tax pressure and structure (both as a share of GDP) in three groups of countries, 
1990, 2001 and 2009 
  Total AL  Group 1  Group 2  Group 3 
   1990  2001  2009 1990 2001 2009 1990 2001 2009 1990 2001 2009 
Income  2.9  3.4  4.9 2.2 4.1 5.8 3.4 3.4 5.3 2.3 3.2 3.8 
Property  0.5  0.7  0.7 1.6 2.2 2.1 0.3 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.1 0.2 
VAT (general, on goods and services)  3.0  5.7  6.5 6.6 9.1  10.7  2.5 5.3 6.0 2.0 4.4 5.0 
Excise taxes on goods and services  1.9  2.4  1.8 3.0 2.4 1.6 1.9 2.6 2.0 1.2 1.8 1.6 
International trade  1.9  1.2  1.1 1.5 0.8 1.7 2.1 1.3 1.0 1.6 1.5 0.9 
Other taxes  0.8  0.3  0.3 0.4 0.5 0.8 0.7 0.3 0.2 1.3 0.2 0.2 
Total tax revenues  11,0  13.7  15.4 15.3 19.0 22.7 10.9 13.3 15.0  8.7  11.2 11.7 
Social security  2.3  2.8  3.3 6.1 6.0 7.6 1.9 2.7 3.1 0.8 1.1 1.0 
Total tax revenues (with social 
security)  13.3  16.5  18.7 21.3 25.0 30.3 12.8 16.0 18.1  9.5  12.2 12.7 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration on the basis of CEPAL data. 
4  Impact of recent changes in taxation on growth and income distribution 
4.1  Effects of taxation on growth 
In the standard neoclassical theory fiscal policy has no impact on long-term growth. 
While fiscal policy can speed up growth in the short run, the long-run growth rate is 
unaffected. However, the lack of convergence of growth rates among countries predicted 
by the neoclassical growth model weakens these conclusions and stimulated a 
reassessment of the impact of fiscal policies on the divergence in growth rates across 
countries. As part of this effort, Barro (1990) analysed how taxation and public 
expenditure affect growth under the assumption of no deficit financing. His model 
suggests a positive government role in promoting economic growth via the provision of 
public goods and services which raise the marginal productivity of capital and encourage 
higher investment. However, this positive effect depends on the initial level of taxation, 
as an excessive tax burden reduces the rate of growth. While insightful, this model suffers 
from a few limitations when applied to the developing countries, where structural factors 
condition the way taxation affects growth. For this reason, Loayza (1996) extended 
Barro’s model by introducing in it the hard-to-tax informal sector. In particular, he 
focused on how government policies influence the size of the latter, and how this affects 
long-run growth.6 Loayza too found that an initial rise in tax rates improves growth 
thanks to an improvement in the quality of public infrastructure and government 
institutions.7 Beyond a certain threshold, however, a further increase in taxes depresses 
growth. The main difference between the two models is that the optimal tax rate is lower 
in the presence of the informal sector.  
 
These two models provide a theoretical underpinning to the claim that a key historic 
cause of the region’s poor growth performance was a weak fiscal policy (Singh 2006). 
Through which channels therefore does taxation affect growth? The first, highlighted by 
both Barro and Loayza, is the provision of public goods such as roads, water and 
                                                 
6  In his model, the informal sector grows in line with the tax rate and share of public services available 
only in part to informal agents, and falls due to a rise in the government’s enforcement strength and 
productivity of public services. 
7  Growth rises due to a greater supply of public services and an efficient enforcement system able to limit 
the expansion of the informal sector.   24
sanitation, health and education which raise the rate of return on private investments. In 
this regard, it must be noted that—while still low as compared to other developing 
regions—public investments in Latin America grew from 3.4 to 4.1 per cent of GDP 
between 1997 and 2008. Investment in infrastructure rose as well (reaching 1.25 per cent 
of GDP over 2001-06), though it is still below its 1980s level, the recommended 3 per 
cent needed for sustained growth, and that of other developing regions (Calderón and 
Servén 2010). Likewise, between 2000 and 2008 public expenditure on education and 
health rose respectively from 3.9 and 2.6 to 4.4 and 2.9 of GDP, contributing in this way 
to major gains in life expectancy at birth (which rose from 71.7 to 73.5 years), secondary 
enrolment rates (from 54.8 to 64.7 per cent) and number of years of education of the 
workforce (from 7.4 to 8.2) (Cornia and Martorano 2009).  
 
A second pathway through which taxation affects growth is macroeconomic stability. 
Indeed, governments which collect adequate amounts of revenue are less likely to 
monetize the budget deficit or borrow abroad, thus reducing the probability of 
macroeconomic crises. Greater macroeconomic stability and a stronger fiscal stance also 
make it possible to adopt countercyclical policies during crises, thus reducing the loss of 
output during difficult periods. In this regard, the increase in tax/GDP ratios observed 
during the 2000s allowed several countries to follow a countercyclical, ‘weakly 
countercyclical’ or ‘acyclical’8 fiscal policy (Suescún 2008).9 Indeed, most countries in 
the region recorded positive primary surpluses since 2003 (Vladkova-Hollar and 
Zettelmeyer 2008; Cornia 2010, Figure 10). If in the early 2000s an improvement in the 
fiscal balance was achieved thanks to stagnation of public expenditure (Figure 10), since 
2004 such improvement was due to an increase in revenue that more than compensated 
the rise in public spending (Jiménez and Gómez-Sabaini 2009).  
 
Figure 10: Fiscal indicators (% of GDP), between 1990 and 2009 
 
Source: CEPALSTAT. 
                                                 
8  Martorano (2011) shows that the output gap has no significant impact on the primary balance, that a 
positive coefficient of public debt explains why governments comply with the budget constraint, that 
terms-of-trade fluctuations do not significantly affect the fiscal balance and that fiscal rules reduce the 
deficit. These findings differ from those of Gavin and Perotti (1997) and Ocampo (2010) but are similar 
to those of Clements et al. (2007) and Dos Reis et al. (2007), thus corroborating the fact that fiscal 
policy in Latin America was acyclical. 
9  Chile successfully managed its fiscal policy through a fiscal rule that targets a structural surplus of 1 per 
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A third channel through which an increase in taxation can raise growth is a lowering of 
income inequality. As suggested by most of the theoretical and empirical literature, high 
inequality depresses growth, as it causes political economy effects (Alesina and Rodrik 
1994); exacerbates capital-market imperfections (Aghion et al. 1999); raises political 
instability and crime rates which cause uncertainty among investors, raises transaction 
and reduce growth (Venieris and Gupta 1986, Bourguignon 1998); and erodes 
microeconomic incentives and increases labour-shirking, free-riding and supervision 
costs (Cornia 2005).  
 
Hereafter follows an econometric test of the impact of taxation on the growth rate of GDP 
per capita over the years 1990-2008 for 18 Latin American countries. The test takes the 
following form: 
 
it i it it it e X Policies Fiscal gr c GDP + + ⋅ + ⋅ + = η γ β α _ _ /;   i = 1,…, N; t = 1, …, T,   (1) 
 
Where  I  and  t  denote respectively the country and time period; X is a vector of 
determinants and control variables, ηi is the time-invariant country’s fixed effect; and eit is 
the idiosyncratic error term. Fiscal policies are defined by the ratio of tax revenue/GDP 
and budget deficit/GDP. The effect of taxation on gross fixed capital formation (both 
private and public) is measured by means of the variable investment/GDP, while that on 
human capital is measured by the ratio of workers with secondary and tertiary education 
to that of those with primary education. The two control variables added are the 
international terms of trade (which may affect GDP/c growth) and the Gini coefficient of 
household income per capita (a proxy of social cohesion). The macro-panel nature of the 
dataset suggests using the Fixed Effects (FE) estimator (Model 1, Table 10). Yet, Model 2 
which uses the Random Effect (RE) estimator generates broadly similar results. In turn, 
Model 3 presents the results of a FE regression in which the lagged dependent variable 
was included as a regressor to capture its persistence over time. Such inclusion generates 
however problems of endogeneity, which may be present also for other regressors. To 
deal with this problem, Model 4 presents the results of the same causal model computed 
using the System GMM estimator. Table 10 presents the results of the regression analysis. 
The Wald test indicates that the variables are jointly significant. The AR (1) test reject the 
null hypothesis of no autocorrelation, while the AR (2) fails to reject it. Finally, the 
Sargan Test rejects the null hypothesis, and thus the instruments pass the test. 
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Table 10: Regression results (dependent variable: GDP/c growth rate) 18 Latin American 
countries, 1990-2008 
 











GDP/c growth rate (t-1)                                         (+)      0.1356  0.2601*** 
Investment/GDP                                                    (+)  0.2413**  0.1786***  0.2253**  0.0807** 
Ratio of workers with 2ary and 3ary 
education on those with 1ary education                (+) 
-0.1985 0.2217* -0.1552 0.1818** 
Tax/GDP ratio                                                        (+)  0.3841**  0.1505***  0.2516**  0.0821** 
Budget deficit/GDP                                                (+)  0.4775***  0.4876***  0.4606***  0.4053*** 
International terms of trade                                    (+) 0.0161  0.0188  0.015  0.013 
Gini coefficient of disposable income/c                  (-)  -0.1592  0.0970*  -0.1219  -0.0813** 
Constant  -1.3015 -0.3706 -1.0218  2.025 
      
Observations  311 311 298 298 
R-squared  0.247  0.266  
Wald chi2      (p – value)   0.000  0.000 
Sargan Test  (p – value)      0.110 
AR (1)           (p – value)      0.001 
AR (2)           (p – value)       0.122 
 
Notes: *, **, *** significant at 10%, 5% and 1%. Sargan test for over identifying restrictions. AR(1) and AR(2) 
test are the Arellano-Bond test for the first and second-order autocorrelation of the first differenced residuals. 
Beyond the lagged dependent variable, Tax/GDP ratio, Budget deficit/GDP, Investment/GDP and the Gini 
Coefficient of disposable income/c are considered endogenous. 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
The results confirm the hypotheses formulated about the impact of the recent tax changes 
on growth during the 2000s, as the regression coefficients have the sign identified exante 
on the basis of the received theory. The only exception is represented by the ratio of 
workers with secondary and tertiary education to those with primary education, as the 
sign of the parameter changes across specifications. All other coefficients exhibit stable 
signs. The results (especially those of Model 4) suggest that during the last decade 
economic growth was positively related to past performance, and that the 3-4 per cent 
average increase in tax/GDP ratio observed between 2002 and 2009 raised the GDP/c 
growth rate by between 0.3 and 1 per cent, contradicting in this way the claims of 
neoclassical theory about the efficiency costs of ‘distortionary taxes’ such as direct taxes 
(Kneller et al. 1999). The results confirm also that every point of improvement in fiscal 
balance raised the growth of GDP/c by 0.40 points. Similar effects are observed in the 
case of the investment/GDP ratio (which rose, if modestly, thanks also to a rise in public 
investment made possible by higher taxation) and human capital investment. Model 4 
shows also that income inequality is detrimental to growth and that the 4-5 Gini points 
average decline observed in the 2000s may account for 0.32-0.40 points of the GDP 
growth during the decade. Finally, in none of the specifications the recent gains in 
international terms of trade appear to have affected growth.  
4.2  Effects of the recent tax reform on income inequality 
Tax policy can affect the distribution of income by generating the revenue used to 
increase public expenditure on human capital, raising in this way the wages of the newly   27
schooled workers and, through that, improving the primary distribution of income. In 
addition, it can influence directly the distribution of post-tax, pre-transfer income by 
means of progressive taxation. This study focuses only on this second effect. In this 
regard—as shown by Gómez-Sabaini (2006) and Chu et al. (2004)—while in the 
advanced economies the Gini coefficient of the distribution of post-tax pre-transfer 
income declines by 3-5 Gini points because of taxation, in many developing countries 
such decline is generally minimal or negative. Yet, even in the advanced countries the 
strongest distributive effect of fiscal policy is related to the level and targeting of public 
expenditure (Appendix Table 1).  
 
In Latin America the high Gini coefficients of the distribution of gross income have until 
recently been hardly affected by taxation which either played a modest or even 
unequalizing role. Things appear to have changed somewhat during the last decade, 
though it is not easy to document precisely this change given the limited number of tax 
incidence studies, the differences in the years and unit of analysis, wellbeing criteria 
chosen, hypotheses made about incidence, and other assumptions which limit the 
comparability of different studies. Be as it may, the available evidence for the 1990s 
suggests that taxation was in most cases regressive. During that decade only in Venezuela 
did taxation generate a modest redistributive effect, while in Argentina, Honduras, 
Mexico and Nicaragua it worsened it by between two and five Gini points (Table 11). 
The inability to collect revenue and its regressive incidence was particularly evident in 
Central America and Mexico (Agosin et al. 2005, and Table 11).  
 
Table 11: Reynolds–Smolensky index for Latin American countries, 
1990s and 2000s (Gini points) 
 
 1990s  2000s  2000s-1990s 
Argentina -1.95  1.90  3.85 
Bolivia -1.10  ….  …. 
Brazil -0.70  0.42  1.12 
Chile -0.80  0.27  1.07 
Colombia ….  -0.10  … 
Costa Rica  -0.98  1.24  2.22 
Dominican Rep.  ….  -0.20  … 
Ecuador -0.70  0.70  1.40 
El Salvador  -1.40  -0.75  0.65 
Guatemala -0.77  1.20  1.97 
Honduras -2.87  -0.10  2.77 
Nicaragua -5.20  0.17  5.37   
Panama -0.69  0.91  1.60 
Uruguay -0.20  1.10  1.30 
Venezuela   0.76  ….  …. 
 
Source: See sources cited in Appendix Table 1. 
 
As a result of the changes in tax policies described in Section 3.3, the Reynolds 
Smolensky index10 became positive or less negative in all countries in Table 11, 
                                                 
10 The Reynold–Smolensky index is the difference between the Gini coefficients of the distribution of 
personal income before and after taxes. In most cases, the surveys do not provide the amount of taxes   28
enhancing in this way the equalizing effect of taxation. The largest improvements 
(ranging between some two and five Gini points) were recorded in Argentina, Honduras 
and Nicaragua. However, despite these gains, the tax systems remained regressive in 
most of Central America (Table 11). 
 
An interesting case is that of Nicaragua which introduced a tax reform in the early 
2000s
11 and witnessed an improvement in the Reynolds–Smolensky index by 5.37 points 
between the 1990s and mid 2000s (Gómez-Sabaini 2005). Its former tax system depended 
for 80 per cent on indirect taxes while offering special allowances and exemptions which 
caused a major loss of revenue and that treated taxpayers in an unequal way (Gasparini 
and Artana 2003). To correct this situation, the reform of 2003 aimed at improving the 
equity of taxation while simplifying the tax structure. Despite the recent reforms, in all 
Andean countries except Ecuador the tax system continues to have a minimal or no 
redistributive effect (Table 11) and, at times, reinforces an income concentration 
favouring the richest decile (Barreix et al. 2006) as observed for Bolivia and Peru (ibid.). 
In Ecuador, the incidence studies focusing on direct taxes show that the personal income 
tax is highly progressive, though its redistributive impact is modest. Indeed, the reform of 
January 2008 turned out to be purely theoretical, as its greater progressivity was 
accompanied by a decline in tax collection (Roca 2009).  
 
More encouraging is the situation of the Southern Cone countries (Table 11). The latest 
analysis of the redistributive impact of taxation in Brazil (Cetrangolo and Gómez-Sabaini 
2006) shows that in 2003 the tax system generated a more progressive distribution with 
respect to the past. Argentina recorded an improvement in overall tax progressivity 
(ibid.). The study by Gómez-Sabaini et al. (2002) on 1997 data shows that the differential 
tax burden
12 exceeded 115 per cent for the lowest decile while it was below 100 per cent 
for the top decile. However, in recent times, the tax system has become more progressive 
(Table 11). With respect to Chile, Engel et al. (1998) showed that during the 1990s the 
tax structure was slightly regressive, but a recent analysis by Jorratt (2010) shows that it 
became slightly progressive. Also in this case, the result may be explained by the 
changing composition of direct and indirect taxes. Finally, in Uruguay the tax reform of 
2007 made an explicit effort at improving the equity of taxation. Before the reform, the 
tax system relied on a large number of taxes and exemptions. Its incidence was basically 
neutral. However, according to Amarante et al. (2007) the tax reform of 2006 reduced the 
after-tax Gini coefficient by 1.1 points. 
 
To sum up, the recent changes in tax rates and composition have almost always equalized 
at the margin the distribution of market income. The growing contribution of personal 
and corporate income taxes to total tax revenue offset the regressive effect generated by 
the growth of VAT contributions in the 1990s. Moreover, post-tax income equalization 
was strengthened by the reduction of taxes on international trade and excises on oil, 
alcoholic beverages and tobacco (ibid.). Finally, the export taxes imposed in Argentina in 
2002 to tax windfall profits due to rising world prices and accruing to a hard-to-tax sector 
characterized by high asset and income concentration likely improved tax incidence. 
                                                                                                                                               
paid, and the value of the RS index is obtained by imputation techniques which simulate the amount of 
taxes paid on the basis of tax rates and the distribution of gross income. 
11 In 2006 an administrative reform in Guatemala was introduced, while in 2009 a reform to promote 
equity in Nicaragua. The data in Table 11 refer to previous years (Cubero and Vladkova-Hollar 2010). 
12 The differential tax pressure is the ratio between the tax burden borne by each decile and the average tax 
pressure.    29
 
The above discussion has assessed the distributional impact of the recent tax reforms by 
means of a partial equilibrium analysis based on the simulation of survey microdata on 
the distributions of income before and after levying all or some taxes (see for details 
Appendix Table 2), isolating in this way the pure impact of taxation on income 
distribution. However, taxation affects other aspects of economic life such as public 
transfers, expenditure on human capital, growth, employment, and so on which affect the 
distribution of net disposable income by taking into account second-round effects. To 
account for the broader impact of the recent tax reforms, a reduced form regression model 
was tested on aggregate data for the 18 Latin American countries covered in this study 
using as a dependent variable the Gini coefficient of the distribution of disposable income 
per capita for the years 1990-2009 drawn from the IDLA database (Martorano and Cornia 
2011). The econometric specification of the relation between income inequality and tax 
and social expenditure policies takes the form: 
 
it i it it it e X Policies Fiscal GINI + + ⋅ + ⋅ + = η γ β α _   i = 1, 2, …, N; t = 1, 2, …, T   (2) 
 
where X is a vector of relevant control variables, I and t denote country and time period; 
ηi is the time-invariant country’s fixed effect; and eit is the idiosyncratic error term. The 
dependent variable is standardized in terms of Gini of household disposable income per 
capita.13 Fiscal policies are proxied by the ratio of direct taxes to indirect taxes (expected 
exante to have a negative sign) as well as the ratio of expenditure on social protection on 
GDP, where social protection includes both social security and social assistance (lack of 
disaggregated data did not allowed to treat them as separate regressors). As in most 
countries the share of (progressive) social assistance on total social protection is only 
around one fourth, the sign of this variable expected exante is uncertain. The control 
variables included in the regression are the Gini coefficient of the distribution of years of 
education among the workers of 25-64 years of age, the growth rate of GDP per capita, 
and the ratio of the minimum wage to GDP. The first is expected to have a positive 
sign and the latter two a negative sign. Given the panel nature of the data used in 
regression and the object of the analysis, the most suitable estimator is the fixed effects 
(FE) model which is preferable to the random effects (RE), a conclusion confirmed by the 
Hausman test. However, given the persistence over time of the Gini index of income 
inequality, Model 2 includes among the regressors the lagged dependent variable to 
capture the path-dependent and slow moving nature of inequality. Finally, as the 
introduction of the rate of growth of GDP/c may cause a problem of endogeneity, Model 
3 uses the system GMM estimator which allows to overcome this problem (Table 12). 
 
The parameters in Table 12 have the sign expected exante, though those of the minimum 
wage/GDP per capita and public expenditure on social protection are not significant. The 
other parameters are significant and stable across specifications, a sign that they are 
correctly estimated. In particular the parameter of the ratio of direct to indirect taxes is 
sizeable, negative and strongly significant. A one point increase in this ratio reduces the 
Gini coefficient of the distribution of disposable income by between 0.42 and 0.87 points, 
thus confirming that the recent changes in the structure of revenue collection generated a 
favourable, if moderate, redistributive effect. Also the control variables have reasonable 
values: the current level of inequality is strongly and significantly correlated to its past 
level. In turn, the growth rate of GDP/c has a negative but moderate effect on inequality, 
                                                 
13 The data used in regression analysis are included in the IDLA database (Martorano and Cornia 2011).   30
as a one point growth of GDP/c decreases the Gini coefficient by 0.10 points. In turn, the 
coefficient of Gini index of distribution of years of education among the workforce is 
statistically significant. The Wald test indicates that the variables are jointly significant. 
The AR (1) test rejects the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation at the five per cent level, 
while the AR (2) fails to reject it. Finally, the Sargan Test suggests that the instruments 
are valid. Overall, it appears that, after controlling for other interfering variables, the 
recent changes in tax policy affected on average income inequality, confirming the 
theoretical hypotheses presented above and the conclusions presented in the empirical 
literature (Gasparini et al. 2009; Cornia 2010).  
 
Table 12: Regression results (dependent variable: Gini coefficient of disposable income) 18 
Latin American countries, 1990-2008 
 
Variable (sign expected exante on the basis of theory) Model 1 FE  Model 2 FE  Model 3 
system GMM 
Gini coefficient of disposable income (t-1)               (+)    0.6772***  0.4786*** 
GDP/c_growth rate                                                   (-)  -0.0778*  -0.0593**  -0.1030*** 
Direct/Indirect Taxes                                                 (-)  -0.8778***  -0.4246***  -0.6276*** 
Gini coefficient of the distribution of human capital 
among the labour force                                            (+) 
0.0931 0.0962**  0.1049** 
Expenditure on social protection/GDP                   (+/-)  -0.2664  -0.0819  0.048 
Minimum wage index (2000=100)                             (-) -0.0002  -0.0017  -0.0001 
Constant 50.850***  14.221***  23.709*** 
     
Number of observations  269 258 258 
R-squared   0.525  
Wald chi2      (p – value)  0.000  0.000 
Sargan Test  (p – value)     0.234 
AR (1)           (p – value)     0.016 
AR (2)           (p – value)      0.164 
 
Notes: *, **, *** significant at 10%; 5%; and 1%. Sargan test for overidentifying restrictions. AR(1) and AR(2) 
are the Arellano-Bond test for the first and the second-order autocorrelation in the first differenced residuals. 
Beyond the lagged dependent variable, GDP/c_growth rate is considered endogenous. 
 
Source: Authors’ compilation. 
5  Limitations of the recent tax reforms and recommendations for further action 
While important, the recent changes in tax policy have to be intensified in the years 
ahead, especially in Central America and the Andean countries, to increase the 
redistributive and efficiency impact of the tax system. Hereafter follow some realistic 
suggestions on (a) raising the effective tax/GDP ratio to the potential corresponding to the 
level and pattern of development of the countries of the region, (b) raising the revenue 
generated by income and wealth taxes by 3-4 per cent of GDP and reduce that generated 
by trade taxes and selective taxes on goods and service by 1-2 per cent of GDP, so as to 
increase the contribution of direct taxes to around 40 per cent of total revenue, (c) cutting 
revenue losses to 50 per cent of its present level by reducing tax evasion and increasing 
tax compliance, (d) placing greater accent on the ‘fiscal exchange’ or ‘revenue 
bargaining’, i.e. the relation between increases in taxation and the improved provision of 
public goods to all social classes. These recommendations are obviously of general 
character and each of them needs to be adapted to the specific conditions of each country.   31
5.1  Raise the tax/GDP ratio to its potential level 
In most of the region effective tax collection is considerably lower than the potential one 
and than that of countries with similar GDP per capita in other regions. An estimate of the 
additional revenue that could be generated in the region can be obtained by comparing the 
effective tax/GDP ratio of each country (net of social security contributions, as these 
represent premia paid for an insurance contract whose public or private arrangements 
vary from country to country) with its potential value estimated by regression on the basis 
of the logarithm of its GDP per capita and variables (such as the share in total value 
added of hard-to-tax agriculture and easy-to-tax manufacturing) which affect the ease of 
tax collection (Table 13).  
 
Table 13: Effective tax/GDP, revenue effort index, and additional revenue that could be raised 
to reach the potential tax/GDP ratio in Latin American countries, averages for 1999-2007 
Country 
Effective tax/GDP 
(net of soc. security 
contribution) 
Revenue effort index 
Potential tax/GDP 
(net of social security 
contribution) 
Additional revenue 
that could be 
raised 
 (a)  (b)  (c)  (c)–(a) 
Brazil 24.51  1.33  18.48  -6.02 
Argentina 20.70  1.15  17.98  -2.73 
Nicaragua 15.42  1.04  14.83  -0.58 
Bolivia 16.68  0.98  17.09  0.41 
Uruguay 16.37  0.94 17.42  1.05 
Honduras 14.90  0.93  16.08  1.18 
Chile 17.80  0.86  20.83  3.02 
Paraguay 11.07  0.78  14.25  3.18 
Costa Rica  13.81  0.81  17.10  3.29 
Colombia 14.42  0.78  18.52  4.10 
Guatemala 11.35  0.72  16.11  4.75 
Dominican Rep.  13.23  0.73  18.02  4.79 
El Salvador  11.59  0.69  16.74  5.15 
Peru 13.35  0.70  19.04  5.69 
Panama 9.22  0.52  17.79  8.57 
Venezuela 13.21  0.55  22.66 9.45 
Mexico 9.61  0.50  19.25  9.64 
Ecuador 10.11  0.48 21.05  10.95 
LAC 14.30  0.80  17.96  3.66 
Notes: the ‘revenue effort index’ is the ratio of effective to potential tax/GDP ratio (both net of social security 
contributions). The potential tax/GDP ratio was calculated by regression on a panel of 92 developing and 
developed countries and including as independent variables GDP/c, the share of (relatively easy-to-tax) 
manufacturing on GDP, and the share of (hard-to-tax) agriculture on GDP.  
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on data from WDI, CEPALSTAT and ERS. 
 
The results in Table 13 suggest that out of the 18 Latin American countries analysed in 
this paper only Argentina and Brazil show effective tax/GDP ratios higher than the 
potential ones while in Bolivia, Honduras, Nicaragua and Uruguay the effective tax/GDP 
ratios are similar to the potential one. In the remaining 12 countries, the effective levels of 
taxation are way below those expected on the basis of their level and pattern of 
development. This simple exercise confirms there is considerable space for increasing tax 
pressure in much of the region. For the region as a whole, the tax GDP/ratio could be 
raised by 3.66 points, or by more than four points if Argentina and Brazil are excluded 
from the calculations. The case for increasing tax pressure is particularly acute in   32
Ecuador, Mexico, Panama, Peru and Venezuela (where public revenue includes 
considerable amounts of non-tax revenue linked to the exploitation of natural resources or 
strategic resources, which compensate to an extent their low level of tax collection but 
which are generally highly volatile). Catching up to the international standard would 
generate smaller but not negligible amounts of revenue in the remaining countries.  
5.2  Greater balance between direct and indirect taxes  
Making taxation more equitable requires strengthening direct taxation, while reducing the 
weight of regressive selective indirect taxes which still dominate revenue collection in the 
region (Figure 11). As suggested inter alia by Jorratt (2010) in a study on Chile, any 
attempt at enhancing the redistributive impact of taxation requires redesigning income 
and wealth taxes so as to raise their share to around 40 per cent of total revenue and, at 
the same time, making them more progressive. While tax structures in the region have 
already evolved in this direction during the 2000s, a comparison with other regions 
suggests there is further room for moving in this direction (ibid.).  
 
Figure 11: Tax structure in Latin America and other regions, 2006 (% of GDP and total revenue) 
 
 
Note: direct taxes include income and wealth taxes, indirect taxes include general and selective taxes on 
goods and services and taxes on international trade. The rest comprises social security contributions and 
other taxes. 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration on the basis of CEPAL data, IMF-GFS International Financial Statistics and 
World Economic Outlook (IMF). 
 
A key concern about the proposed increase in direct taxation relates to its efficiency 
effects. Yet, the 2007 Uruguayan tax reform and the results in Table 10 show there are no 
universally valid theoretical reasons to believe that greater equity is achieved at the 
expense of growth. For instance, Martorano (2011) found that, contrary to the predictions 
of optimal taxation theory, the income tax introduced in Uruguay in 2007 did not lead to a 
contraction in labour supply. This may have been due to an inelastic labour supply, a 













































level of taxation well below any efficiency-reducing threshold (the rates varied between 
10 and 25 per cent), or the perception that the income tax rise was accompanied by an 
increased supply of public goods which raised wellbeing and the efficiency or private 
investments.  
 
Also in the case of the taxation of capital income (rents, dividends, profits and so on) the 
evidence about its effect on capital flights is far from clear. While most Latin American 
countries tax wealth at low rates on the assumption of high capital mobility, Tanzi (2007: 
10) notes that ‘It is not clear how much truth there is in the assertion that an increase in 
the taxation of dividends, interest incomes, rents, capital gains and profits would lead to a 
(greater) emigration of capital’. Such risk can be further reduced by greater international 
or regional co-ordination in the taxation of capital income, and the introduction of non-
distorting dual tax reform (like that adopted in Uruguay) by which a relatively low flat tax 
rate is levied on the capital income of households and a higher flat tax rate on corporate 
profits.  
 
Property taxation is another way of raising revenue in a progressive way.14 However, at 
the moment, its yield is eroded by exemptions, asset undervaluation, low tax rates, 
administrative weakness and the opposition of asset holders. Beyond the need of 
determining the optimal tax rate and tax base and of considering the differential treatment 
of different classes of property, the crucial question consists in the measurement of 
property value (Bird and Slack 2002). A value-based assessment is suitable in countries 
with developed asset markets and able to count on a regular update of the property 
cadastre. As noted by Stewart et al. (2009: 16) ‘The start-up costs of meeting data 
requirements in the form of a cadastre may be onerous but have long-lasting benefits, 
including improvements in the security of property rights’. 
 
In conclusion, a further improvement of tax progressiveness and efficiency in the region 
requires that an important part of future revenue increase will be achieved by taxing 
income and assets while reducing regressive import and selective indirect taxes without, 
at the same time, reducing the contribution of VAT. The results in Table 14 (left panel) 
suggests that an increase in the share of revenue from income and wealth taxes of three 
per cent of GDP would improve the RS index by between 2.7 and 3.3 points while a two 
per cent decline in the revenue generated by selective indirect taxes would improve it by 
1.7 points, with an overall gain in the RS index of 4.4 to 5 points, which would bring the 
average Latin American country close to the redistribution via taxation similar to that 
achieved in Europe (see Appendix Table 1). Smaller improvements in the RS index 
would instead be achieved by raising the social security contributions. Finally, it must be 
noted that—contrary to a common opinion about the greater effectiveness of 
redistributing income via targeted social transfers—the empirical evidence (see Appendix 
Figure 1) shows that the two approaches to redistribution (via taxation and income 
transfers) tend to correlate closely. 
  
                                                 
14 As Kaldor (1963: 413) suggested, ‘the taxation of land can be a very potent engine of economic 
development’.   34
Table 14: Regression analysis of the determinants of the Reynolds-Smolensky (RS) index  
 
  Variables expressed as a share of GDP   Variables expressed as % of total 
revenue 
 1  2  3         
Tax/GDP ratio  --  --  --    -0.0006  0.0002  0.0008 
Direct tax  0.0122***  0.0094**  0.0095**    0.0025**  0.0023**  0.0055***
Indirect taxes  -0.0062        -0.0007     
Trade taxes   -0.0149***  -0.0110**  -0.0100*    -0.0019*  -0.0012  0.0031 




















Social security contributions      
0.0027 
 
    
0.0047** 
 
Constant -0.0492*  -0.0482*  -0.0516*    -0.0777  -0.0466  -0.4271**
Observations 36  36  36    36  36  36 
R-squared 0.42  0.44  0.41    0.43  0.44  0.61 
 
Notes: *, **, *** significant at 10%, 5% and 1%. 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
 
The increase in direct taxation in the region needs to be carried out by emphasizing in 
particular the PIT. Indeed, an important limit of direct taxation in Latin America is that it 
is mainly levied on corporate dividends and only to a much lesser extent on the earnings 
of physical persons (Table 15). In most cases, the latter group reaches barely ten per cent 
of the active population due to the small size of the formal sector. As a result, the 
corporate sector generates an average income tax revenue of 3.6 per cent of GDP
15 as 
opposed to the 1.4 per cent paid by physical persons. In extreme cases, as in Paraguay, 
the physical persons do not pay income tax at all.  
 
Reducing this imbalance depends of course on the expansion of the formal sector but 
requires also measures to reduce current tax exemptions on interests on public and private 
bonds, dividends, capital gains and incomes received by nationals residing abroad. At the 
same time, it is necessary to protect the corporate income tax base through legal changes 
with respect to transfer prices, interest deductability, limits to the credits originating from 
firms incorporated in fiscal paradises, a broadening of direct taxation at the source, and 
other norms in the field of international taxation. 
 
  
                                                 
15 In the OECD countries the income tax paid by the corporate sector is on average 3.9 per cent of GDP 
while that paid by physical persons is on average 9 per cent of GDP.   35
Table 15: Structure of income tax payments in selected Latin American countries 
Country (year)  Corporate 
(in % of GDP) 
Individual  
(in % of GDP) 
Total  
(in % of GDP) 
Corporate/individual
ratio 
Argentina (2007)  3.6  1.6  5.4  2.3 
Bolivia (2007)  3.0  0.2  3.3  15.0 
Brazil (2007)  5.1  2.6  7.7  2.0 
Chile (2007)  7.3  1.2  8.4  6.1 
Dominican Rep. (2007)  2.9  1.1  4.0  2.6 
Ecuador (2006)  2.3  0.8  3.1  2.9 
El Salvador (2007)  2.7  1.9  4.6  1.4 
Guatemala (2007)  2.9  0.3  3.4  9.7 
Honduras (2004)  3.7  1.6  5.3  2.3 
Mexico (2005)  2.4  2.2  4.6  1.1 
Panama (2006)  2.9  2.0  5.0  1.5 
Peru (2007)  5.9  1.4  7.2  4.2 
Uruguay (2007)  2.6  1.0  3.5  2.6 
Latin America  3.6  1.4  5.0  2.6 
 
Notes: The regional average is computed on 13 countries as no data was available for the other countries. 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration on the basis of data from CEPAL and official sources of each country. 
5.3  Increasing tax compliance and reducing tax evasion 
A higher level of tax compliance and a sizeable reduction in tax evasion constitute 
obvious elements of any approach aiming at improving tax equity in the future. A first 
step in this regard consists in reducing the tax exemptions and priviledges granted during 
the 1980s and 1990s with the aim of attracting domestic and foreign investments. In many 
cases such tax incentives did not lead to an increase in gross fixed capital formation but 
offered an opportunity for reducing tax payments and modifying the regional and/or 
sectoral allocation of private investments. Despite the difficulties encountered in 
estimating it, the empirical evidence suggests that the revenue loss due to tax incentives 
varied in 2007 between two and eight points of GDP (Table 16).  
 
Table 16: Revenue losses entailed by the concession of tax expenditures, Latin America, 2007 
Country  in % of GDP  in % of tax revenues 
Argentina 2.21  8.9 
Brazil 2.29  9.1 
Chile 4.97  24.6 
Colombia 3.52  22.0 
Ecuador 4.60  35.3 
Guatemala 7.91  63.5 
Mexico 5.92  50.7 
Peru 2.05  11.9 
 
Notes: Methodological differences do not allow to fully compare the above results. For instance, in 
Guatemala the revenue losses are computed as the sum of the minimum income not subjected to income 
tax, while in Chile they are computed as the difference between the marginal income tax rate on 
corporations and the maximum tax rate on the dividends received by physical persons. 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration on the basis of Jiménez and Podestá (2009).   36
A second major step in improving compliance consists in reducing tax evasion. To deal 
with this problem, it is important to estimate its level by major taxes, as done below in 
Table 17. Though still sizeable, the percentage evasion of VAT has been declining as a 
result of the emphasis placed on its control during the last two decades by the tax 
administrations, especially in Argentina, Chile, Ecuador and Mexico. In contrast, tax 
evasion declined less in the case of income tax.  
 
Table 17: Estimated tax evasion rates for the VAT and income tax 
  





Estimated tax evasion 
Year 






Argentina  21.2  2006 49.7  --  --  2005 
Bolivia  29.0  2004 --  --  --  -- 
Chile  11.0  2005 47.4  46.0  48.4  2003 
Costa Rica  28.7  2002 --  --  --  -- 
Colombia  23.5  2006 --  --  --  -- 
Dominican Rep.  31.2  2006 --  --  --  -- 
Ecuador  21.2  2001 63.8  58.1  65.3  2005 
El Salvador  27.8  2006 45.3  36.3  51.0  2005 
Guatemala  37.5  2006 63.7  69.9  62.8  2006 
Mexico  20.0  2006 41.6  38.0  46.2  2004 
Nicaragua  38.1  2006 --  --  --  -- 
Panama  33.8  2006 --  --  --  -- 
Peru  37.7  2006 48.5  32.6  51.3  2006 
Uruguay  26.3  2006 --  --  --  -- 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration on the basis of official sources and (for the income tax) 
Jiménez et al. (2010). 
 
As far as VAT is concerned, there is first of all a need to intensify the measures discussed 
in Sections 3.2 and 3.3 such as promoting the registration of informal firms, introduce 
substitute regimes for hard-to-tax activities, and of special regimes for the collection of 
VAT from large firms or the state itself which buy inputs from a large number of 
suppliers, or sell their products through many independent outlets can also be 
contemplated. Second, there is a need to introduce new measures, including a tighter 
control on firms which issue fiscal credits (false invoices) in favour of other firms in 
return of a fee. As for the corporate income tax, a main problem is how to overcome the 
subtle legal distinction between tax evasion and legal tax elusion.  
 
In addition, an intensification of the administrative reforms undertaken during the last two 
decades will also be necessary, especially in Central America and the Andean region. A 
key component of these reforms is the shift from a ‘tax-by-tax’ approach to one which 
emphasizes the functional character of the various tax activities (policy direction, 
technical and normative aspects, rate setting, tax collection, data management), so as to 
fully cover the various linkages each of them has with the tax administration through a 
‘fiscal current accounts’ and the subdivision of taxpayers according to their size (with big 
and small taxpayers subjected to different tax regimes). A second measure for the 
modernization of tax administration consist in the integration of all entities with   37
responsibility for tax collection (domestic taxes, custom services, and social security) in a 
centralized ‘semi autonomous revenue authority’ which may be granted greater autonomy 
and incentives by allocating it a budget proportional to the amount of the taxes collected. 
 
A third step for a further strengthening of tax administration consists on placing greater 
emphasis on its internal efficiency (OECD 2010). In this regard, Table 18 illustrates a 
series of key indicators of efficiency of the tax administrations, starting from the 
‘collection costs’ i.e. the ratio between all costs incurred by the central tax administration 
and the total revenue collected over a given time span. In 2009 such costs in the region 
were equal on average to 1.66 per cent, a value sensibly higher than that of various 
OECD countries (though similar to that of the Asian countries), thus suggesting there is 
room to reduce the collection costs in parts of Latin America. Similar considerations can 
be made when looking at administrative costs/GDP and staffing indicators, though this 
may be due to lower investments in human capital, ITC technology and the introduction 
of new taxes which, at the beginning, are more costly to collect. Overall, past experience 
with reforms suggests that an improvement of the efficiency and effectiveness of tax 
administration can be achieved only if there is a political commitment to the reforms, an 
adequate stock of human resources led by a competent leader, the willingness to drop old 
administrative procedures, and the development of a reform calendar setting specific 
objectives, costs and implementation schedule.  
 
Table 18: Indexes of efficiency of tax administrations in Latin America, 2009 
 
Country 












Argentina 2.35  0.63    1741  863  100 
Bolivia --  0.12    7610  3606  -- 
Brazil 1.00  0.21    6109  3054  -- 
Chile 1.52  0.13    4248  1717  -- 
Colombia 0.99  0.13    4830  2607  -- 
Costa Rica  2.02  0.23    3749  1817  -- 
Dominican Rep.  1.86  0.17    3839  1670  -- 
Ecuador 1.26  0.14    4483  2333  -- 
El Salvador  1.37  0.07    5622  2757  184 
Guatemala 2.37  0.25    3451  1131 -- 
Honduras --  0.84    2778  1362  -- 
Mexico 0.96  0.08    3056  1308  740 
Nicaragua --  0.22    3194  1288  -- 
Panama --  --    6567  3078  -- 
Paraguay 2.44  --    6111  3163  -- 
Peru 2.05  0.28    3987  2041  531 
Uruguay 1.45  0.19    2680  1479  -- 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration on data from CIAT and USAID (last column). 
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5.4  Place greater emphasis on ‘fiscal exchange’ and the strengthening of the social 
contract 
As noted in Section 3.1, with the exception of the Southern Cone, in much of the region a 
fragile social contract between state and citizens has historically been based on regressive 
and coercive taxes. Delegitimation of political institutions and power of lobbies 
represented a major obstacle to the adoption of equitable tax reforms, most citizens had 
low confidence about the state’s ability to solve their problems and so resisted the 
payment of taxes (Gómez-Sabaini and O’Farrell 2009).  
 
The election of truly democratic governments and steady progress in education since the 
mid 1990s in many countries has weakened this vicious cycle, and raised the sense of 
social responsibility, willingness to pay taxes and demand for redistribution (see the 
analysis of Daude and Melguizo 2010 on the basis of the 2007 and 2008 waves of the 
Latinobarómetro). A new social contract is thus slowly evolving in parts of the region by 
linking more closely than before the quality and quantity of services provided in the fields 
of health, education (including also tertiary education), social assistance (whether 
universal or targeted) and the idea that citizens should pay taxes, a sentiment which seems 
to be growing among an expanding middle class. The ability to raise equitable taxes in 
the years ahead will thus depend on a strengthening of such embryonic new social 
contract which is based on relations of ‘fiscal exchange’, trust and co-operation rather 
than coercion and mistrust. Such sentiments seems rooted in particular among people who 
benefitted from redistribution in the past and who now argue for greater redistribution in 
favour of less fortunate groups (ibid.). The governments in the region should thus 
recognize that the issue of the ‘political costs of taxation’ needs to be addressed in 
parallel to that of growing ‘political benefits of expanding social expenditure’.16 
 
Obviously the extent, sectors and modalities of growing social and infrastructural 
expenditure will vary from country to country and so do the modalities of social 
consultation required to ensure co-ordination, but the principle applies to the entire 
region. The scope for emphasizing ‘fiscal bargaining’ in the future is particularly 
important in Central America and the Andes region which may still be further away from 
a stable political and social equilibrium. An encouraging lesson in this regard comes from 
the Chilean tax reform introduced after the return to democracy in the early 1990s 
(Breceda et al. 2008). Its fundamental features were the capacity of the new government 
to reduce the elite’s opposition to an increase in tax/GDP ratio of about two points, 
enlarge the political decision-making process, and deliver an expansion of social 
expenditure which benefitted both the poor and middle class.  
                                                 
16 A paper by Lustig (2011) analysing the redistributive effects of fiscal operations concludes that, while 
still modest, such effect is greater than found in earlier studies. It suggests also that closing the current 
‘poverty and human capital gap’ would require an additional social expenditure equal to 2.4 per cent of 
current government spending in Brazil, 4.9 in Argentina, 5.9 in Mexico, 14.1 in Peru and 17.4 in 
Bolivia.   39
APPENDIX 
 
Appendix Figure 1: Relation between redistribution (in Gini points) via taxation and public 
expenditure  
 
Appendix Table 1: Redistributive effects of taxes and transfers in selected countries 
Country  Year 
Gini coefficient of disposable per capita 
household income  
Changes in Gini coefficients due to  
fiscal operations  
Before  After taxes and 
transfers  Total  Due to  
taxation 
Due to  
transfers 
Australia  2003  0.461 0.312  0.149  0.047  0.101 
Austria  2004  0.459 0.269  0.190  0.034  0.156 
Belgium  2000  0.542 0.279  0.263  0.063  0.201 
Canada  2004  0.433 0.318  0.114  0.038  0.076 
Denmark  2004  0.419 0.228  0.191  0.042  0.149 
Finland  2004  0.464 0.252  0.212  0.044  0.168 
France  2005  0.449 0.281  0.168  0.017  0.151 
Germany  2004  0.489 0.278  0.210  0.052  0.158 
Greece  2004  0.462 0.329  0.133  0.007  0.127 
Ireland  2004  0.490 0.312  0.178  0.046  0.132 
Luxembourg  2004  0.452 0.268  0.184  0.037  0.147 
Netherlands  2004  0.459 0.263  0.196  0.040  0.156 
Norway  2004  0.430 0.256  0.174  0.035  0.139 
Spain  2004  0.441 0.315  0.126  0.001  0.124 
Sweden  2005  0.442 0.237  0.205  0.037  0.168 
Switzerland  2004  0.395 0.268  0.128  -0.003  0.130 
UK  2004  0.490 0.345  0.145  0.021  0.124 
United States  2004  0.482 0.372  0.109  0.043  0.066 
           
Czech Republic  2004  0.468 0.267  0.201  0.038  0.163 
Estonia  2004  0.493 0.340  0.153  0.034  0.120 
Israel  2005  0.491 0.370  0.121  0.045  0.076 
Korea  2006  0.334 0.311  0.023  0.006  0.017 
Poland  2004  0.527 0.320  0.207  0.005  0.202 
Romania  1997  0.372 0.277  0.095  0.013  0.082 
Taiwan  2005  0.324 0.305  0.019  0.003  0.016 
Turkey  1997   0.490    -0.014   
         
Argentina  2006  0.589  0.479  0.110  0.019  0.091 
Brazil  2006  0.570  0.486  0.084  0.014  0.070 
Colombia  2004  0.568  0.562  0.006  -0.001  0.006 
Costa Rica  2004  0.559  0.479  0.080  0.012  0.068 
Guatemala  2006  0.521  0.507  0.014  0.012  0.002 
Mexico  2006  0.537  0.497  0.040  0.003  0.037 
Uruguay  2004-06  0.542  0.428  0.124  0.010  0.114 
Source: Authors’ compilation on Leiden LIS Budget Incidence Fiscal Redistribution Dataset, Centrangolo and Gómez-
Sabaini (2006), OECD, IMF, IDLA database and a literature search.  40
Appendix Table 2: Reynolds–Smolensky index for Latin American countries, 1990s and 2000s 
   
GINI Reynold-Smolensky 







tax  VAT Excise Fuel  Tobacco 
Alcoholic 
beverages Trade 
Argentina  2006 0.5133 0.4941 0.0192                Gómez-Sabaini  and  Rossignolo  (2008) 
Argentina  2004 0.438 0.447  -0.0090           Cont et al. (2009) 
Argentina  1997 0.5481 0.5676 -0.0195  0.0040  -0.0059  -0.0002       Gómez-Sabaini et al. (2002) 
Bolivia   2000 0.556 0.567  -0.0110  -0.0010  -0.0010  -0.0090  0.0000  0.0000   Barreix et al. (2006) 
Brazil  2006 0.57 0.556  0.0140          
Leiden LIS Budget Incidence Fiscal 
Redistribution Dataset 
Brazil  2003 0.603 0.5988  0.0042           Salvadori Dedecca (2010) 
Brazil  1999 0.642 0.649  -0.0070 0.0080 -0.0120            Immervoll et al. (2006) 
Chile  2003 0.5791 0.5764 0.0027  0.0207  -0.0177  -0.0008  -0.0014  -0.0005   Jorratt (2010) 
Chile  1996 0.4883 0.4961 -0.0078           Engel et al. (1998) 
Colombia  2004 0.51352 0.51452 -0.0010          
Leiden LIS Budget Incidence Fiscal 
Redistribution Dataset 
Colombia  2003 0.537 0.537  0.0000  0.0080  -0.0040    -0.0010  -0.0010   Barreix et al. (2006) 
Costa Rica  2004 0.6017 0.5893 0.0124 0.0079 -0.0032  -0.0003          IICE (2011) 
Costa Rica  2000 0.482 0.4827  -0.0007 0.0030  -0.002  0.001        -0.002  Cubero and Vladkova-Hollar (2010) 
Costa Rica  1988 0.4473 0.4571 -0.0098  0.0053          Bolaños (2002) 
Dominican Rep.  2004 0.5106 0.5126 -0.0020 0.0347 -0.0050    -0.0014 -0.0005 -0.0007    Barreix et al. (2009) 
Ecuador  2003 0.407 0.4  0.0070  0.0050  0.0020    -0.0010  0.0000   Barreix et al. (2006); Barreix and Roca (2007) 
Ecuador  1998 0.663 0.67  -0.0070           Gómez-Sabaini (2006) 
El Salvador  2006 0.5034 0.5109 -0.0075 0.0087 -0.0133    0.0002 -0.0005 -0.0013    Barreix et al. (2009) 
El Salvador  2000 0.474 0.488  -0.0140 0.0010 -0.0130 0.0000        -0.002  Cubero and Vladkova-Hollar (2010) 
Guatemala  2006 0.521 0.5090  0.0120          
Leiden LIS Budget Incidence Fiscal 
Redistribution Dataset 
Guatemala  2004 0.463 0.463  0.0000 0.0020 -0.0060 0.0000        0.0040  Cubero and Vladkova-Hollar (2010) 
Guatemala  2000 0.5957 0.6034 -0.0077 0.0011 -0.0077    -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0001    Barreix et al. (2009) 
Honduras  2005 0.5697 0.5707 -0.0010 0.0050 -0.0050    0.0010 -0.0010  0.0000 -0.0040 
Barreix et al. (2009); Cubero and Vladkova- 
Hollar (2010) 
Honduras  2000 0.543 0.571  -0.0280           Gómez-Sabaini (2006) 
Mexico  2006 0.449 0.446  0.0030           Estrada (2009) 
Mexico  2002 0.49 0.49  0.0000           Gómez-Sabaini (2010) 
Mexico  1989 0.506 0.55  -0.0440           Gómez-Sabaini (2006) 
Nicaragua  2001 0.5963 0.5946 0.0017  0.0058  -0.0035  -0.0001  -0.0003  0.0000   Barreix et al. (2009) 
Nicaragua  1998 0.51 0.562  -0.0520 0.0040 -0.0290 -0.0190        -0.0030  Cubero and Vladkova-Hollar (2010) 
Panama  2003 0.6364 0.6274 0.0090  0.0052  -0.0011  -0.0005  -0.0001  -0.0003  -0.0010  Barreix et al. (2009) 
Panama  2000    0.0000           Gómez-Sabaini (2006) 
Peru  2000 0.535 0.543  -0.0080 0.0013 -0.0120    0.0030 0.0000  -0.0010    Haughton (2005) 
Venezuela  1997 0.4006 0.393 0.0076           Seijas et al. (2003) 
Uruguay  2008 0.454 0.442  0.0120 0.0140 -0.0020            Amarante et al. (2007) 
Uruguay  2006 0.454 0.453  0.0010 0.0060 -0.0030            Amarante et al. (2007) 
Uruguay  1996    -0.0020           Grau and Lagomarsino (2002)   41
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